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19491 RECENT DECISIONS
not appear to have been within the contemplation of the legislature.
This holding appears to be sound for the Wisconsin statute does not
even intimate that its purpose was other than to regulate the rights
to that type of property deemed in law to be lost. Nor can there
be any doubt that this money was purposely concealed for safe-
keeping, or that the plaintiff has exercised complete good faith.
There is little direct authority on the question of merger of treasure-
trove into lost property, and generally it appears that the courts will
uphold the rights of persons who can bring themselves under the
established common law rule which distinguishes between treasure-
trove and lost property, when they have acted in good faith, for the
common law will not be lightly brushed aside by strained decisions or
subtle technicalities.
H. B. E.
VENDOR-PURCHASER-RESTRICTIVE, COVENANTS-MARKETABLE
TITLE-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.-The vendor brought an action for
specific performance of a contract for the sale of property situated in
Asbury Park, N. J. The purchaser's defense was that the plaintiff
was unable to convey a marketable title because of a restrictive cove-
nant prohibiting the sale of liquor on the premises. The covenant
dated back to 1875 and all the property in the vicinity was burdened
with a similar provision by the common grantor. At the time of the
contract liquor had been sold openly at the plaintiff's hotel for many
years; also liquor was being sold by another hotel within one block,
by three others within two blocks and by eight others within three
blocks. Held, for the plaintiff. The "hazard of litigation" to which
a purchaser must not be subjected depends upon the chances of suc-
cessful attack as viewed by the court and does not include the remote
possibility of an idle suit. Casriel v. King, - N. J. Eq. -, 58 A.
2d 269 (1948).
The purchaser of real property has a right to a marketable title
which is reasonably safe against loss and attack.' "A marketable
title is one that is free from a reasonable doubt concerning title." 2
This requirement must be distinguished from the objection that as
a matter of fact, established by proofs, the vendor has no title at all,
an objection which may be raised by either party and which will as a
matter of law defeat an action of specific performance. In an action
of specific performance by the vendor if there arises reasonable doubt
concerning the title, the court without deciding the question regards
the doubt as sufficient reason for not compelling the buyer to take the
conveyance. 3 "... a purchaser is not to be compelled to take prop-
1 Barger v. Gery, 64 N. J. Eq. 263, 53 At. 483 (Ch. 1902).2 Vought v. Williams, 120 N. Y. 253, 24 N. E. 195 (1890).
3 POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE § 198 (3d ed. 1926).
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erty, the possession of which he may be compelled to defend by
litigation." 4 Where the buyer is willing to accept the questionable
title, the vendor cannot use the doubt as a defense to specific per-
formance." The doubt which can arise must relate either to the law
or facts of the case. Sometimes the courts will pass on a question of
general law relating to the title but they are especially wary of con-
struing instruments. 6 The uncertainty must be something more than
mere speculation, theory or possibility. If the existence of the alleged
fact or outstanding right is a very improbable or remote contingency
which according to ordinary experience has no probable basis the
court may compel the purchaser in such a case to complete his title.7
The doubt must be as affects the value of the land or will interfere
with its sale. 8 It would seem that a rational doubt exists when a
court of law would not feel compelled to instruct a jury to find that
the fact existed, on the existence of which the vendor's title depends.9
Thus in Moser v. Cochrane 10 the title was declared marketable
where there was a bare possibility that it might be affected by the
decedent's debts, it appearing that the estate had been regularly pro-
bated and a balance of $10,000 left in the personal estate. Ordi-
narily, if a clause in a deed prohibits the erection of a building on
the premises the court will grant no decree but a restriction against
such a use as would amount to a nuisance is not an incumbrance on
title since the restriction is no greater than that imposed by law.1 '
The defense that the title was unmarketable was held untenable where
in the chain of title the corporation had given a deed in an ultra vires
transaction; 12 also where an outstanding mortgage was barred by
the statute of limitations.'"
- See note 2 supra.
5 Gartrell v. Stafford, - Neb. -, 11 N. W. 732 (1882).
6 Flemming v. Burnham, 100 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. 905 (1885), in which title
depended on the construction of a will, whether testator's children took under
an absolute fee or one determinable on their death. It was an issue of law
purely arising on construction of the will and the court did not grant specific
performance; Jeffries v. Jeffries, 117 Mass. 184 (1874); Hunting v. Damon,
160 Mass. 441, 35 N. E. 1064 (1894); Cornell v. Andrews, 35 N. J. Eq. 7
(Ch. 1882).
7 Ferry v. Sampson, 112 N. Y. 415, 20 N. E. 387 (1889).
8 See note 2 supra.
9 Shriner v. Shriner, 86 N. Y. 575 (1881).10 107 N. Y. 35, 13 N. E. 442 (1887).
"Floyd v. Clark, 7 Abb. N. C. 136 (N. Y. 1879), where title to city lot
was restricted against use for cemetery purposes it was held marketable be-
cause such was apparently declared a nuisance by city ordinance; cf. Dieterlen
v. Miller, 114 App. Div. 40, 99 N. Y. Supp. 699 (1st Dep't 1906) in which a
restriction prohibiting "any noxious, offensive or dangerous trade or business"
an incumbrance because it was not a nuisance per se.
12Fahey v. Ottenheimer 219 App. Div. 668, 220 N. Y. Supp. 491 (1st
Dep't 1927).
13 Ouvrier v. Mahon, 117 App. Div. 749, 102 N. Y. Supp. 981 (2d Dep't
1907); Paget v. Melcher, 42 App. Div. 76, 58 N. Y. Supp. 913 (1st Dep't
1899).
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The doctrine of marketability is essentially an equitable one but
in New York, under the merger it has been carried over in an action
at law; where the title depended on parol evidence and was therefore
unmarketable, the defendants in an action of specific performance
counterclaimed at law and recovered partial payments already made.
The court stated that it would be an absurdity to refuse specific per-
formance and not grant the return of the deposit.' 4 The presumption
of death after seven years' absence unless attended by corroborative
evidence is not enough to make the title marketable. 5 In New York
the presumption of death after twenty years did not make title
marketable, 6 but after forty years' absence title has been declared
free from reasonable doubt.' 7 In Pennsylvania where the title was
affected by the possibility that a seventy-year-old woman might have
issue it was held "presumption of law in favor of issue notwithstand-
ing advanced age." Is The pendency of proceedings to condemn land
for public use is such a defect as to excuse the buyer.19 While gen-
erally the title to property restricted against the sale of liquor is held
not marketable, 20 the principal case is distinguished in that the cove-
nant had been openly violated for many years and was long since
abandoned, and this abandonment had been acquiesced in by the suc-
cessors in title, making the source of attack fanciful and not real.
G.D.
1 Moore v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 22 N. E. 233 (1889).
25 See 21 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1907-08).
16 See note 2 supra.
17 See note 7 supra.
38 List v. Rodney, 83 Pa. St. 483 (1877).
19 Cavenaugh v. McLaughlin, 38 Minn. 83, 35 N. W. 576 (1887).
20 Genska v. Jensen, - Wis. -, 205 N. W. 548 (1925).
